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The German attack on Norway on April 9, 1940 and the subsequent German occupation of Norway are considered some of the most dramatic events in Norwegian history. Even though the Second World War had erupted in September of 1939 and Norway had declared herself neutral as in World War 1, the Norwegian Government was not able to avoid military action from either of the belligerents. The attack came as a complete surprise and almost a century of Norwegian isolationism and stated neutrality failed. This SRP will identify, discuss and prioritize the key issues that caused the Norwegian government to remain neutral during the inter-war years, despite significant changes in Norway's geo-political position.
Background
Norway has a long and colorful history. The earliest settlers came after the latest ice-age, around 10.000 B.C, and were fishers/hunters/gatherers. 1 Over thousands of years, the nation evolved, until it was gathered as one kingdom under King Harald Haarfagre around A.D. 870
during the Viking age. From 1380, Norway had a joint king with Denmark, and therefore entered the "Kalmar-union" in 1397, where Sweden, Denmark, and Norway joined in a union, initially under the rule of Queen Margrete. 2 Over the years that followed, this union dissolved and Norway became more and more a nation ruled by the Danish king. Sweden retained her sovereignty, became a regional great power, and fought numerous wars with Denmark, particularly in the 17 th and 18 th centuries. These wars were both over Norway, and over Norway now entered a union with Sweden, with a common king, but with her own parliament and prime minister. Norway was obviously the weak party of the union.
During the late 1800s, the relationship between the two countries gradually deteriorated.
This was due to several issues in which the governments of the two countries had differing views. 6 What ultimately led to the dissolution of the union was the issue over the Norwegian right to her own foreign service, a separate Norwegian system of consulates and embassies around the world. This issue had been raised by Norway in the 1890s, but had been flatly rejected by the Swedish. When the Norwegian parliament in June of 1905, decided that a Norwegian system of consulates was to be established, the Swedish King refused to sanction this decision. This immediately led to the Norwegian Government's resignation.
Constitutionally, the King was now without a Norwegian Government, and was not able to bring any Norwegian parties or politicians to form a new Government. The physical distance to the great powers of Europe had led Norwegians to see Norway as a peripheral nation. There was therefore a strong Norwegian perception that the country was located at a safe distance from the great powers, and that possible threats to Norwegian sovereignty were more or less non-existent. The threat from Sweden was perceived as strong in the years that followed immediately after the dissolution of the union. The threat gradually disappeared until during the First World War, when some feared that Norway and Sweden would be forced to enter the war on either side of the belligerents.
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The three significant powers that had to be taken into account in the consideration of Norway's strategic position, were Great Britain, Germany, and Russia. Russia was perceived as a long-term challenge, if her previous expansion from the 18 th century were to continue, still, Russia was relatively weak militarily in the North and had most of her fleet in the Baltic Sea.
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She was therefore not perceived as a direct threat, although a general fear of Russian expansionism was expressed.
Norway had long-standing and strong ties with Great Britain, both politically and economically, but it was clear that the British had vital strategic interests linked to Norway and . 19 In these regulations, neutrality was defined as a nation state's legal status during a war. A Government could state its nation's neutrality in the event of war based on how involved the nation expected to be in the subsequent acts of war by the belligerents.
The regulations aimed at securing rights for the neutral nations to retain normal international trade, as long as trade in "contraband" with the belligerents was avoided.
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In Norway, the views on what neutrality entailed were somewhat divided, although the In this way, in Norway, national security became more tied to ideals and international law than to realistic considerations of the strategic capabilities needed to protect and defend this neutral status.
A special treaty had been agreed between Sweden/Norway, Great Britain, and France in November 1855, during the Crimean War. In return for French and British support in the event of a Russian attack, the two countries had agreed to an "English-friendly neutrality" and to never cede territory to Russia. Technically, this treaty was still valid in 1905, even though it was 50 years old. 23 The treaty was, however, outdated and needed to be updated if it was to have any significance. On this basis, Norway, in 1905, tried to achieve a guarantee for her neutral status from the four most important great powers, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany. This did not, however, change the Norwegian perception of its' strategic position.
Norway and World War 1
In February of 1914, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gunnar Knudsen, stated in the Parliament that there was at present a "world political sky without clouds". 27 That this somewhat naïve view of the world was clearly wrong was demonstrated when the "Great War"
broke out a few months later. For Norway, it was of vital importance to maintain its trade, fisheries, merchant shipping, and most important, its imports of grain, coal, and fuel. 28 At the same time, there was a political consensus in Norway to use every means possible to remain outside of the war.
Norway declared herself neutral on August 4, 1914, three days after the German declaration of war on Russia. 29 At the same time, the Norwegian Navy and parts of the Army were mobilized. Consequently, in the fall of 1914, Norway stood up a relatively strong military "neutrality guard." The strong military response to the war was regarded by most politicians as a necessity for Norway to remain in accordance with international law, and in order to deter violations of Norwegian neutrality. 30 It was also considered necessary to have a permanent strong "neutrality guard", as this would make eventual escalation unnecessary in the event of a crisis. 31 In the fall of 1914, the Royal Navy tested the Norwegian response to a breach of neutrality by entering Norwegian waters with a British Naval vessel, and was convinced of
Norwegian ability and will to fend off foreign intrusions.
Even though Norway stayed neutral, it was a clearly western-oriented neutrality. Some have later called Norway "the Neutral ally," due to her British-inclined neutrality. 32 This policy was, however, more or less forced upon Norway by Britain, who had interests in severing
Norwegian trade with Germany. British economic warfare was not directed against Norway, but
Norway became a victim of it, as Germany was an important trade partner. The neutral states were, of course, entitled to trade with either of the belligerents, but limited to "non-contraband" goods.
The British demanded full control of Norwegian trade with Germany, as well as the right to inspect any Norwegian merchant ships bound for Germany for contraband. The Germans, on the other side, waged a war by submarine against shipping bound for Britain, and as the Norwegian merchant marine was heavily involved in this, it suffered great losses. Norway, therefore, unwillingly became a participant in the economic warfare, not because the government deliberately wanted it, but due to Norway's strategic position between the belligerents.
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The war had a decisive impact on Norway, even though Norway was not a belligerent.
Internationally, the war created a deficiency of raw materials and commodities, and as Norway relied heavily on imports, she was very vulnerable to blockade by the great powers. Until 1916, this blockade had loopholes, though. 34 This led initially to blooming times for the domestic trade, before galloping inflation and chronic deficiencies caused a negative effect.
In 1918, food rationing became necessary. Freight rates for the Norwegian shipping soared. The cost of bringing one ton of goods over the North Sea increased from nkr 4.60 in 1914 to nkr 260 in 1917. 35 This "bull market" had a cost. About 900 Norwegian ships were sunk, and approximately 2,000 sailors lost their lives during the war, primarily due to the unrestricted German submarine war from 1917 on. 36 The ships sunk represented about half of the Norwegian tonnage of 1914. New tonnage in the post-war years enabled Norway to build the fourth largest, but most modern, merchant marine in the world before 1940. This fact had great importance in the later 1940-45 war. For some, the "Great war" brought enormous wealth. The fortunes that some gained during these years had to be invested, and numerous companies and banks were established.
Norwegian foreign policy In 1920, Norway joined the League of Nations. Some politicians considered that this was against the official policy of neutrality, but the majority thought that Norwegian relations with all the major powers would suffer if Norway stayed outside. The Norwegian delegates to the League worked consistently for disarmament and a system where disputes between nations could be solved through international law. 37 As Norway entered the League of Nations in 1920, she lost some of her traditional neutrality. The League of Nations was to establish a collective security system, in which the member states were committed to participate in military sanctions if such were warranted. As this system broke down over the events in Europe in the second half of the 1930's, Norway returned to its traditional neutrality in 1938. 38 The international law regulating neutrality had not, however, changed since World War 1, even though the experiences from the period had showed the deficiencies of neutral status when international trade and blockades had been taken into account. The Norwegian Government opined that a minimalist interpretation of International Law applied, and that there were no clear demands on the level of "neutrality guard" that would be required. Thus, Norway could maintain whatever military force the Government considered adequate, and be able to respond with that force if need be. In this way, the Government made it possible to downscale the military.
There were also considerable differences between the military and the political leadership The former distance from international conflicts was not necessarily an effective buffer anymore. As a small state, Norway had to see herself becoming an "object" for the great powers, where Norwegian national interests had less weight than the interests of these powers, who could utilize economic or military power to support their demands.
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Of particular significance was the development of air power, which had made it possible for German air power to challenge the Royal Navy's dominance of the North Sea. between the Soviet Union, Germany, and Great Britain, and warned that Norway could well be subject to military action in the early stages of a future war. His opinion was, however, only shared by the Army General Staff, and not by the Navy or the Norwegian politicians.
Before 1918, the "old" political parties, the conservatives and the liberals, had been the main alternatives at the elections. The liberals, the party "venstre", had a one-party majority of Europe gathered. 47 The Labour Party had a long history of anti-militarism. The traditional fear that military forces could be used by a bourgeois leadership against the working classes was widespread.
There was also a strong perception in the party that the officer corps was largely conservative and could therefore not be trusted. The fact that the national socialist and Army officer, Vidkun After forming the Government in 1935, the Labour Party had to change course. This was, of course, due to the changing political environment in Europe, but also due to a general domestic political consensus that the Armed Forces needed better funding after years of "financial famine". In the years that followed, the Government therefore increased the funding for military matters. Still, the former anti-militarists, now in position, were not able to provide clear guidance on priorities and objectives. It was also difficult for them to understand military matters. The Norwegian Armed Forces
The Norwegian Army has a history that goes back to 1628. The Navy was formally established in 1814. Before 1814, the military of Norway was controlled from Denmark, and both in the 17 th and 18 th century, wars were fought with Sweden. After 1814, the Norwegian military achieved a somewhat more independent role towards the Swedish Armed Forces.
The Norwegian military "establishment" was never a large one. Limited conscription was introduced in 1854, but the mandatory training time for the soldiers was short. Periodical "refresher training" of the mobilization forces was to establish acceptable military units to counter attacks against Norway. A cadre of professional officers and NCOs manned the small staffs of the mobilization units, and were responsible for keeping operational plans current as well as organizing the periodic refresher training periods. There existed very few permanently manned units in the Army, but these were at company and battalion level, and had the missions of guarding the royalty, and controlling the border.
From 1889, the Norwegian Army was organized in three general categories of units.
"Linjen" ("the line") included the most prioritized units, which were regionally located. On paper, the Norwegian Army of the 1890s could mobilize five infantry brigades of "Linjen", each with four battalions, as well as cavalry, artillery, and service support units. In addition, a significant number of units of lower priority existed on mobilizational status, with local area defense in mind. These units were manned with older conscripted personnel when mobilized, and had limited capabilities, but were still an asset that had to be taken into account by a potential aggressor. Some cooperation with the Swedish existed, but mostly over material procurements and standardization of ammunition, arms, and supplies. Deep mistrust between the nations resulted in numerous defensive positions being built against the Swedish border in the expectation of an attack.
In the 1890s, the Norwegian Parliament prioritized the Armed Forces in the national budget and increased funding significantly. This led to important materiel procurements and more training time, as well as construction of more defensive positions in the East against Sweden. The most important effect was still that the Navy procured new ships, among them several modern battleships and cruisers, and its' capabilities were increased significantly. Until this time, the Navy had had a role in decentralized coastal defense, and had only been equipped with small vessels. From the 1890's, the Navy's role was widely seen as to defend Oslo against a Swedish naval attack. The Navy was therefore largely based in the Oslofjord, South of Oslo. It is generally accepted that the Norwegian Navy was at a peak in capability in 1905.
This may have had an impact on the Swedish decision not to go to military action in 1905.
In the years that followed 1905, the previous political prioritization of the Armed Forces vanished. Still, in particular the Norwegian Navy was able to "float" on the capacity of 1905, and was therefore able to mount an acceptable naval "neutrality guard" during the First World War. The Army was worse off and deteriorated towards 1914. Still, some Army units were mobilized during the war and conducted border control, especially on the borders in the north.
Demobilization of these units was started during the summer of 1918, as it seemed the war was reaching an end. The Navy was kept in place until after the armistice.
The years of "neutrality guard" during the war caused considerable strains on the Armed Forces. Even though the Army and Navy managed their tasks and Norway stayed out of the war, shortage of personnel and material had significant effects.
After 1918, a significant downscaling of the defense was initiated. Most other nations did the same. In Norway, most politicians saw future war as only a remote possibility. The overwhelming view was that the horrors of the "Great War" would lead to a long period of peace and stability. Norwegians had great faith in arms control and in that the League of Nations would deal with future disputes between states. Many also considered that the experiences of the neutral status during the war, as well as Great Britain's continued strong position in the North Sea, ensured that a similar policy would enable Norway to remain neutral once again, if war should break out.
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Consequently, the Norwegian Armed Forces was not prioritized in the national budget, and gradually deteriorated. New technology and operational techniques were not taken into account. Several major studies of the Norwegian Defense structure were carried out in the years that followed 1918, each resulting in gradual reductions of its size and structure. At the same time, the Army and Navy were consistently under funded, so that even the dwindling structure did not get the personnel resources, the materiel and, most important, the training that was necessary. On paper, the Armed Forces consisted of a significant number of units and capabilities, but as training was almost non-existent, the capabilities were questionable, indeed.
In Norway, conscription had been utilized for a very long period to supply the Armed Forces with soldiers. The compulsory service had been of varying duration, but a system of mobilization had been possible to establish. Some argued that the length of the compulsory service, which was typically about 3 months (and an additional 3-6 weeks of refresher training in mobilization units) in the Army from 1905-1920, was not sufficient to produce units with acceptable standard.
In 1933, further changes in the Armed Forces were implemented, most significantly for the Army. Significant parts of the Army were placed in "long-term storage". In other words, the units existed on paper, but no training was performed, nor was the materiel updated or acceptably maintained. The Army's ability to mobilize was therefore seriously affected in a negative way. No tests of the mobilization system were performed. The length of the compulsory service in the Army was also reduced even further. An infantry recruit of the mid1930s served only 72 days, hardly enough to make him an acceptable soldier, and definitely not to produce units capable of countering any future attack on Norway. Other branches in the Army were even worse off, some only training the soldiers 48 days.
The deterioration of the military in the 1930s was partly due to political sentiments that there was no need for a strong military, but also over the fact that the Norwegian state finances were not very strong at the time. The depression hit Norway as any other state in Europe, would be to prevent the outbreak of war in Norway. A capability for rapid mobilization of land forces and adequate ability to respond to neutrality breaches from the belligerents were therefore important. Despite this view, little was done to implement changes and improvements.
In the 1920s, for some, the perceived threat on Norway had been seen as internal, not as coming from any other states. 54 To some degree, the revolutionary inclination of the Labour Party in the early 1920s had caused a fear that a revolution might be launched, and that workers might attack military stores to seize firearms. Regulations for safer storage of firearms were therefore issued, and general planning for countering the threat was carried out. In retrospect, there was no real danger for any revolution in Norway, but the mistrust between the labour party and the military remained strong for many years.
Shortly after the labour party came into power in 1935, they had to change their previous anti-militaristic views. In 1936, the Labour Government suggested additional funding for the military to overcome obvious shortages. The obvious reason for this was the clouds gathering over Europe and the perception that war may be in the coming. Increased funding for the military in the years that followed made it possible to improve training and exercises, and some "refresher training" of mobilization units was carried out. Procurements of materiel, particularly from abroad, remained difficult. Most foreign vendors of military materiel had obligations towards their own governments, and could not prioritize Norwegian contracts. The increased spending in the late 1930s may therefore be seen as "too little, too late".
Consequently, severe deficiencies existed as Norway approached 1939. The mobilizetion system remained slow and cumbersome, the training standard had deteriorated severely due to chronic lack of exercises, and the materiel was old and worn, and not at all updated for modern warfare. Furthermore, the places for mobilization were placed far from the areas of
Norway that were perceived to be of highest importance, the South-West part and North
Norway. The added priority to the Armed Forces and the increased funding in the late 1930s
did not cause any significant improvements. The Norwegian military was therefore in a sad state as the war in Europe erupted in 1939.
Norwegian foreign policy 1939-1940
The same day that Germans attacked Poland, the Norwegian Government issued a proclamation that Norway would remain neutral in the conflict. As Great Britain declared war on Germany two days later, another proclamation of neutrality was issued. By the 22 nd of September 1939, both Germany and Great Britain had issued statements that they would respect Norwegian neutrality. There were strong protests from the German authorities about the Norwegians allowing the incident to happen. The Norwegian protests to the British were equally strong.
Norwegian, Swedish and American experts on international law declared that the British had violated Norwegian neutrality severely. The British admitted to a "technical violation" but claimed they had a moral right for this violation. The incident further encouraged German planning for the subsequent attack on Norway, which eventually started on April 9, 
Conclusion
Based on the discussion above, there are several reasons why the Norwegian authorities stuck to a policy of neutrality until the German attack on the 9 th of April 1940.
The first and foremost reason is probably that neutrality was chosen "by default". This had been the traditional policy for thirty five years, was perceived as having worked during
World War 1 and was therefore the obvious choice for the Norwegian politicians. It is worth noting that there was almost no discussion whatsoever about this fundamental choice among politicians all across the political landscape, as the discussion was more over which forces should be kept to guard this neutrality. It is also a point that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign The third reason, linked somewhat to the first, is that there is reason to claim that the Norwegian politicians had a deep rooted idealism, firmly believing that international disputes should be solved via arbitration and international law. They were therefore fundamentally "antiwar" and somewhat "anti-militarist". This was the case for many politicians, both in the labour party, but also among the liberals and to some degree among the conservatives. Even after the breakdown of the League of Nations in the late 1930's, this Norwegian idealism did not change. The failure of international sanctions to deter some states from military action should have warned the Norwegian politicians during those years.
A fourth reason to keep in mind was the distinct perception in Norway that Great Britain would support and fight for Norway if Germany was to attack. A British "security guarantee"
was not officially given by the British. Still, this was inferred by Norwegian politicians who believed that Britain would never allow Germany bases in Norway without interfering. Several comments that Norway should try to stay out of the war by all means, but also avoid "coming into the war on the wrong side" were made unofficially. The perception about the British as a de-facto "back-up" was strong, but was not followed up with actual preparations for support, as this would have constituted a breach of the neutrality rules.
All in all, the policy of neutrality failed when Germany attacked on the 9 th of April 1940, and Norway entered the war on the side of Great Britain. Norwegian requests for military assistance were answered positively, but, for several reasons, the campaign in Norway resulted in the complete loss of Norway to Germany.
The most significant result of the pre-war neutrality and the experiences of the war, was that Norwegian politicians became willing to let Norway enter the NATO in 1949. By that, the forty four year history of Norwegian neutrality was buried.
Endnotes
1 The general Norwegian history has been accessed at the internet or has been found in general books on the topic. The general historical points made in the SRP are not controversial and are mentioned in numerous sources. See: http://historie.cappelen.no/historie1/kap11/.
2 Norwegian history, accessed on the internet at: http://historie.cappelen.no/historie1/kap13/.
